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Abstract 
 This article examines whether, to give effect to the section 26 
constitutional right to adequate housing, courts can (or should) 
compel the state to expropriate property in instances when it is not 
just and equitable to evict unlawful occupiers from privately-owned 
land (unfeasible eviction). This question was first raised in the 
Modderklip case, where both the Supreme Court of Appeal (Modder 
East Squatters v Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd; President of the 
Republic of South Africa v Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd 2004 3 All 
SA 169 (SCA)) and Constitutional Court (President of the Republic 
of South Africa v Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd 2005 5 SA 3 (CC)). 
dodged the question, opting instead to award constitutional 
damages to the property owner for the long-term occupation of its 
property by unlawful occupiers. It is clear from cases such as 
Ekurhuleni Municipality v Dada 2009 4 SA 463 (SCA), that, mindful 
of separation of powers concerns, courts have until very recently 
been unwilling to order the state to expropriate property in such 
circumstances. At the same time, it is increasingly evident that the 
state has failed to fulfil its constitutional obligations to provide 
alternative accommodation for poor communities. In this context, 
this article argues that there is a growing need for the judiciary to 
consider, as part of its role to craft effective remedies for 
constitutional rights violations, the issue of judicial expropriation. It 
does so, first, through an analysis of the relevant jurisprudence on 
evictions sought by private landowners and, second, through an in-
depth engagement of the recent Western Cape High Court case, 
Fischer v Persons Listed on Annexure X to the Notice of Motion and 
those Persons whose Identity are Unknown to the Applicant and who 
are Unlawfully Occupying or Attempting to Occupy Erf 150 
(Remaining Extent) Phillipi, Cape Division, Province of the Western 
Cape; Stock v Persons Unlawfully Occupying Erven 145, 152, 156, 
418, 3107, Phillipi & Portion 0 Farm 597, Cape Rd; Copper Moon 
Trading 203 (Pty) Ltd v Persons whose Identities are to the Applicant 
Unknown and who are Unlawfully Occupying Remainder Erf 149, 
Phillipi, Cape Town 2018 2 SA 228 (WCC). 
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1 Introduction 
The issue of the judicial expropriation of property in the context of an 
unfeasible eviction was first raised in the Modderklip case. Here, the 
Supreme Court of Appeal (SCA) grappled with the conundrum of how to 
protect the property rights of a landowner whose land had been unlawfully 
occupied by 40,000 people rendered homeless following their eviction by 
the state, while at the same time protecting the housing-related rights of the 
unlawful occupiers. Finding that "in an ideal world the state would have 
expropriated the land and taken over [Modderklip's] burden", the SCA 
tantalisingly remarked: "it is questionable whether a court may order an 
organ of state to expropriate property."1 Leaving this question unanswered, 
the SCA instead devised the novel remedy of constitutional damages for the 
infringement of the landowner's property rights.2 On appeal, the 
Constitutional Court (CC), too, dodged the question, finding that "it is not 
necessary to decide, in this case, whether or not a court can order the 
expropriation of property."3 
Yet this is a question that is increasingly coming into play in the context of 
orders sought for the eviction of unlawful occupiers by private landowners 
where – as in the Modderklip case - the scale and/or duration of the 
occupation combined with the non-existence of alternative housing means 
that it is not just and equitable to grant an eviction order. Seeking to 
contribute towards a response to the question left hanging by the SCA and 
CC Modderklip judges, this paper critically examines whether courts can 
and should require state organs to expropriate property where an eviction 
is not feasible. It does so a) through an analysis of the relevant 
jurisprudence on evictions sought by private landowners and b) in the light 
of the current Fischer litigation4 that has sought to compel the state to 
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reviewers. I would like to thank the Wits Southern Centre for Inequality Studies 
(SCIS) for contributing towards this research.  
  Jackie Dugard. BAHons LLB (Wits) MPhil (Cambridge) LLM (Essex) PhD 
(Cambridge). Associate Professor, School of Law, University of the Witwatersrand, 
South Africa. E-mail: jackie.dugard@wits.ac.za. 
1  Modder East Squatters v Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd; President of the Republic 
of South Africa v Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd 2004 3 All SA 169 (SCA) (hereafter 
Modderklip SCA) para 41. 
2  Modderklip SCA para 43. 
3  President of the Republic of South Africa v Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd 2005 5 SA 
3 (CC) (hereafter Modderklip CC) para 64. 
4  Fischer v Persons Listed on Annexure X to the Notice of Motion and those Persons 
whose Identity are Unknown to the Applicant and who are Unlawfully Occupying or 
Attempting to Occupy Erf 150 (Remaining Extent) Phillipi, Cape Division, Province 
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exercise its statutory powers to expropriate land to accommodate vast 
numbers of unlawful occupiers at Marikana informal settlement in Cape 
Town. 
2 The eviction conundrum: What to do when a private 
property eviction is not just or equitable? 
Section 26(1) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 
(hereafter the Constitution) guarantees everyone's right to access to 
adequate housing, and section 26(3) provides that "no one may be evicted 
from their home, or have their home demolished without an order of court 
made after considering all the relevant circumstances." The protection 
against eviction without a court order is elaborated on in the Prevention of 
Illegal Eviction from and Unlawful Occupation of Land Act 19 of 1998 (PIE), 
which establishes in sections 4(6) and 4(7) that a court may grant an order 
for eviction only if it is "in the opinion that it is just and equitable to do so, 
after considering all the relevant circumstances".5 
Section 4(6) applies to cases in which an unlawful occupier has occupied 
the land for less than six months prior to eviction proceedings being 
commenced, and lists among the relevant circumstances for a court to 
consider the "rights and needs of the elderly, children, disabled persons and 
households headed by women." Section 4(7) applies to cases in which an 
unlawful occupier has occupied the land for more than six months prior to 
eviction proceedings’ being commenced, and over and above the rights and 
needs of the elderly, children, disabled persons and households headed by 
women, lists as a relevant circumstance to be considered by any judge 
"whether [except where the land is sold in a sale of execution pursuant to a 
mortgage] land has been made available or can reasonably be made 
available by a municipality or other organ of state or another land owner for 
the relocation of the unlawful occupier …"6 Although there was initially some 
uncertainty about whether the provision of alternative land (or 
accommodation) should be considered as a relevant factor only in 
occupations of longer than six months, in The Occupiers, Shulana Court, 11 
Hendon Road, Yeoville, Johannesburg v Steele7  and Occupiers of Portion 
                                            
of the Western Cape; Stock v Persons Unlawfully Occupying Erven 145, 152, 156, 
418, 3107, Phillipi & Portion 0 Farm 597, Cape Rd; Copper Moon Trading 203 (Pty) 
Ltd v Persons whose Identities are to the Applicant Unknown and who are Unlawfully 
Occupying Remainder Erf 149, Phillipi, Cape Town 2018 2 SA 228 (WCC) (hereafter 
Fischer). 
5  Own emphasis. 
6  Own emphasis. 
7  2010 4 All SA 54 (SCA). 
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R25 of the Farm Mooiplaats 355 JR v Golden Threat Ltd8 the courts 
established decisively that the lists in both section 4(6) and 4(7) of relevant 
circumstances for courts to consider prior to granting an eviction order were 
in-exhaustive and that in many situations alternative land/accommodation 
would be a relevant factor to consider in occupations of shorter than six 
months. 
More generally, through a series of cases – most notably Government of 
the Republic of South Africa v Grootboom9 and Port Elizabeth Municipality 
v Various Occupiers10  – the CC has established that it would ordinarily not 
be just and equitable to evict unlawful occupiers if this would render them 
homeless, translating into a positive obligation for the state to provide 
emergency shelter where an eviction would otherwise lead to 
homelessness. In the context of state-led evictions,11 rather than resulting 
in the wholesale provision of emergency shelter, the positive obligation to 
provide emergency shelter to evictees has for the most part (and particularly 
in the City of Johannesburg where many of the more recent evictions cases 
have been located) resulted in the state’s simply not seeking the eviction of 
unlawful occupiers.12 But any unofficial slowdown on state-led evictions has 
not stopped private landowners from seeking to evict unlawful occupiers in 
order to enjoy their full range of property rights, including the rights to use 
and redevelop their properties unencumbered by unlawful occupiers. 
                                            
8  Occupiers of Portion R25 of the Farm Mooiplaats 355 JR v Golden Threat Ltd 2012 
2 SA 337 (CC) (hereafter Mooiplaats) para 16 reads: "While this distinction 
[regarding the reference to less than six months' occupation or more than six months' 
occupation in ss 4(6) and 4(7) of the Prevention of Illegal Eviction from and Unlawful 
Occupation of Land Act 19 of 1998 (PIE), respectively] is important, I do not think it 
is decisive to the justice and equity enquiry. This is because, if a court has before it 
a case in which the land occupation falls short of six months, it is obliged to consider 
all relevant circumstances. In an enquiry of this kind, a court should determine what 
the relevant circumstances are." 
9  2001 1 SA 46 (CC) (hereafter Grootboom). 
10  2005 1 SA 217 (CC). 
11  State-led evictions occur when the state seeks to evict from state-owned land or from 
privately-owned land in the public interest as authorised by s 6 of PIE, which 
empowers an organ of the state to institute eviction proceedings in relation to any 
land falling within its jurisdiction. 
12  In some municipalities, including eThekwini and Cape Town, the state attempts to 
get around s 26's positive and negative obligations by engaging "anti-land invasion 
units" to try to prevent people from occupying land and to demolish any shacks found 
on land. This practice by eThekwini Municipality was found to amount to unlawful 
eviction in the Zulu case (Zulu v eThekwini Municipality 2014 4 SA 590 (CC)); and 
MEC for Human Settlements and Public Works of the Province of KwaZulu-Natal v 
eThekwini Municipality 2015 4 All SA 190 (KZD)). In Cape Town, this practice has 
given rise to the Marikana case discussed here. 
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One such case was Modderklip. Here, Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd. 
(Modderklip) was a private landowner of agricultural land in the Benoni area 
of Johannesburg. In May 2000 Modderklip's land was occupied by 
approximately 400 people, who erected 50 shacks on Modderklip's land 
after the municipality had evicted them from the nearby Chris Hani informal 
settlement. Seeking to vindicate its property rights, Modderklip began to lay 
trespass charges against the occupiers. However, those convicted were 
released by the court with warnings and immediately resumed their 
occupation; and subsequently the head of the local prison asked both 
Modderklip and the police to refrain from any further criminal charges 
against the occupiers as there was no space in the prison to accommodate 
them if they were sentenced to prison terms.13 
By October 2000, the Modderklip informal settlement, which became known 
as Gabon, had swelled to accommodate approximately 18,000 people in 
over 4,000 shacks. At this point, having failed in an attempt to get the 
municipality to purchase the land, Modderklip applied to the High Court for 
an eviction order, which was granted in April 2001, authorising the sheriff to 
enlist the police if necessary in executing the order.14 However, by the time 
the eviction order became executable, the settlement had grown to 40,000 
people, prompting the sheriff to insist on engaging a private security firm to 
assist with the eviction and requiring a deposit of R1.8 million (which later 
escalated to R2,2 million), which Modderklip refused to pay since this was 
more than the land was worth.15 Modderklip then brought a further 
application in the High Court to compel the state to execute the eviction 
order. The High Court granted this order, holding that the state was in 
breach of its constitutional obligations to protect property rights by failing to 
give effect to the eviction order (the continued occupation on the land 
despite an eviction order was a serious deprivation of the property owner's 
rights).16 Both High Court judgments were appealed by the state to the SCA. 
According to the judgment of Harms JA in the SCA: 
Basic to this case is Modderklip's right to its property entrenched by section 
25(1) of the Bill of Rights which provides that 'no one may be deprived of 
property except in terms of a law of general application.' De Villiers J [in the 
court a quo] found that the refusal of the occupiers to obey the eviction order 
amounted to a breach of this right... Counsel for the state accepted that this 
                                            
13  Modderklip CC para 5. 
14  Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd v Modderklip East Squatters 2001 4 SA 385 (W). 
15  Modderklip CC para 9. 
16  Modderklip Boerdery (Edms) Bpk v President van die Republiek van Suid Afrika 
2003 6 BCLR 638 (T). 
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finding was justified. Counsel also accepted that the unlawful occupation of 
Modderklip's land per se, even had the eviction order not been granted, 
amounted to a breach of the section 25(1) right. I agree. 
The occupiers have a right of access to housing under section 26(1). That it 
exists is not in issue… But the real issue is not the existence of the right; it is 
whether the state has taken any steps in relation to those who, on all accounts, 
fall into the category of those in 'desperate need'.17 The answer appears to 
be fairly obvious; it did not. Does the state have any plan for the 'immediate 
amelioration of the circumstances of those in crisis?'18 The state, at all three 
levels, central, provincial and local, gave the answer and it is also no. The 
medium and long term plans at present also provide no apparent solution.19 
Commenting on the state's absence of any plans to ameliorate the plight of 
the Gabon occupiers, Harms JA highlighted that: 
To the extent that we are concerned with the execution of the court order, 
Grootboom made it clear that the government has an obligation to ensure, at 
the very least, that evictions are executed humanely.20 As must be abundantly 
clear by now, the court order cannot be executed – humanely or otherwise – 
until the State provides some land.21 
And, concluding that "the state was in breach of its obligations to the 
occupiers [and this] leads ineluctably to the conclusion that the state 
simultaneously breached its section 25(1) obligations towards 
Modderklip",22 Harms JA ruled that it would not be just and equitable to grant 
the eviction order and the only appropriate relief was to allow the occupiers 
to remain on the land until alternative land or accommodation was made 
available to them by the state.23 It is in this context that the SCA raised the 
issue of expropriation, noting that "the state may, obviously, expropriate the 
land in which event Modderklip will not longer suffer any loss …".24 
However, having commented that "it is questionable whether a court may 
order an organ of state to expropriate property", 25 Harms JA sidestepped 
the issue by focusing instead on the novel remedy of "constitutional" 
damages, ordering the state for as long as the occupiers remained on the 
                                            
17  Government of the Republic of South Africa v Grootboom 2001 1 SA 46 (CC) 
(Grootboom) para 63. 
18  Grootboom para 64. 
19  Modderklip SCA paras 21 and 22. 
20  Grootboom para 88. 
21  Modderklip SCA para 26. 
22  Modderklip SCA para 28. 
23  Modderklip SCA paras 43-44. 
24  Modderklip SCA para 43. 
25  Modderklip SCA para 41. 
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land to pay Modderklip for the violation of its constitutionally entrenched 
property rights.26 
On appeal to the CC, Langa ACJ upheld the SCA's findings, albeit with a 
rule of law focus,27 and confirmed the declaratory order for the payment of 
constitutional damages to Modderklip. During the CC hearing, the question 
of whether the Court should order the state to expropriate the land instead 
of ordering an award for compensation was debated. Noting that this was 
strictly not an instance of "the compulsory acquisition of property by the 
state irrespective of the will of the owner" since the owner had indicated a 
"willingness, indeed eagerness, to sell the land to the state",28 the CC 
eluded the question raised by the SCA, commenting that it was not 
necessary to decide whether "a court can order the expropriation of 
property."29 
In a subsequent case, City of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality v 
Blue Moonlight Properties 39 (Pty) Ltd30, the SCA (and the CC thereafter31) 
granted an eviction order to the owner of the property seeking to evict some 
86 unlawful occupiers from an inner city building but made the eviction order 
contingent on the state’s providing alternative housing for the occupiers. In 
doing so, the SCA distinguished the Blue Moonlight facts from those of 
Modderklip, highlighting that in Modderklip "because of the large number of 
persons on the land, their eviction was, for all practical purposes, impossible 
to achieve and that left Modderklip Boerdery without the use and enjoyment 
of its land", whereas there was no question that "Blue Moonlight will be able 
to execute an eviction order if it has to."32 Thus Modderklip and Blue 
                                            
26  Modderklip SCA paras 43-44. At para 44 the SCA concluded that it would be 
inappropriate for it to consider the quantum of constitutional damages to be paid to 
Modderklip as these issues had not been canvassed, and instead ordered an inquiry 
into the amount of damages, which should be calculated with reference to s 12(1) of 
the Expropriation Act 63 of 1975 (as referring to the market value of the relevant 
land). 
27  See for example Modderklip CC para 46, in which the Court stresses that if orders 
are not executed properly that would be a recipe for anarchy and the "purpose of the 
rule of law would be subverted." 
28  Modderklip CC para 62. 
29  Modderklip CC para 64. 
30  2011 4 SA 337 (SCA) (hereafter Blue Moonlight SCA). 
31  City of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality v Blue Moonlight Properties 39 (Pty) 
Ltd 2012 2 SA 104 (CC) (hereafter Blue Moonlight CC). 
32  Blue Moonlight SCA para 71. On appeal, the CC confirmed this reasoning (Blue 
Moonlight CC fn 11). The SCA also pointed out in relation to declining to order 
constitutional damages to the landowner, Blue Moonlight Properties 39 (Pty) Ltd, 
that whereas "Modderklip Boerdery was the innocent victim of a land invasion and it 
took all reasonable steps – and did so expeditiously – to safeguard its interests", 
Blue Moonlight Properties 39 (Pty) Ltd "bought the property in the full knowledge that 
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Moonlight have established a jurisprudential approach to private-initiated 
eviction orders in which the usual course for courts is to grant the eviction 
order and to tie this to the provision of emergency shelter for the occupiers,33 
but in which the courts have acknowledged that the magnitude of some 
cases renders the eviction practically impossible. 
In such cases, there are only two possible remedies to protect the rights of 
both landowners and unlawful occupiers.34 First, to allow the occupiers to 
remain on the property until the state is able to provide alternative shelter, 
and to award the landowner constitutional damages - such as in Modderklip 
- for as long as the owner has to endure the occupation. However, especially 
in cases of large-scale occupation and where the landowner is not happy 
with this arrangement, this is an unwieldy and ultimately suboptimal remedy. 
Arguably, in such situations, a cleaner more socio-economically progressive 
solution is for the courts to order the state to expropriate the relevant land, 
paying just and equitable compensation to the landowner and directly taking 
over the obligation to fulfil the occupiers' housing-related rights. 
Returning therefore to the lingering question from Modderklip: do the South 
African courts have the power to compel the state to expropriate land in 
cases of unfeasible eviction? According to the SCA in the Ekurhuleni, a case 
in which an eviction order was sought in 2009 against some 76 families who 
had unlawfully occupied land since 2004 and where the municipality's only 
plan for them was the eradication "of all informal settlements by 2014",35 the 
answer is no. On appeal, the SCA overturned the order of the Johannesburg 
High Court in which Cassim AJ inter alia ordered the Ekurhuleni 
Metropolitan Municipality "to purchase a property on which an informal 
settlement had been established …", even though such an order had not 
been sought by the parties.36 
In an unusually pointed criticism of the court a quo's judgment, citing from 
another SCA judgment, the SCA (per Hurt AJA) commented: 
                                            
it was occupied by a number of persons" (Blue Moonlight SCA para 71). This finding, 
too, was relied on in the CC (Blue Moonlight CC para 39). 
33  This two-stage eviction process has, since Blue Moonlight, run into systemic 
problems especially in the City of Johannesburg with the state regularly failing to 
uphold the orders to provide emergency shelter, resulting in eviction orders 
constantly having to be varied. See for example Dugard 2014 CCR 265. 
34  For a full discussion of possessory property remedies, including constitutional 
damages and compensation for expropriation, see Boggenpoel Property Remedies 
91-178. 
35  Ekurhuleni Municipality v Dada 2009 4 SA 463 (SCA) (hereafter Ekurhuleni) para 8. 
36  Ekurhuleni para 1. 
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'In exercising the judicial function, judges are themselves constrained by the 
law'. This dictum from the recent decision of this court in National Director of 
Public Prosecutions v Zuma37 restates a time-honoured rule and is probably 
a sanguine reminder to a judiciary which might often, in its efforts to achieve 
the objects of the Bill of Rights in the Constitution, be tempted to chafe against 
the concept of 'progressive' as opposed to 'immediate' realisation of 
constitutional objectives, especially at the governmental and municipal levels. 
This is a case in point.38 
Disapproving of the "robust approach" taken by Cassim AJ in relation to the 
"level of inactivity" shown by the municipality vis-à-vis the circumstances of 
the occupiers, Hurt AJA described the approach as "the very antithesis of 
the approach which this court and the Constitutional Court have endorsed 
in a number of recent decisions" that have stressed the need for "judicial 
deference".39 Despite grudgingly acknowledging that Cassim AJ was 
"perhaps right in coming to the conclusion that the municipality had not dealt 
with the problems of the informal settlement on the property with the 
measure of alacrity which could be reasonably expected of them", for Hurt 
AJA separation of powers concerns clearly dominated. Concluding that the 
municipality's failures "did not justify [Cassim AJ’s] adopting a solution which 
was well outside the limits of his powers",40 Hurt AJA overturned the court 
a quo's order for the municipality to purchase the land, noting that the issue 
in the main application relating to the eviction of the occupiers "has yet to 
be set down for a hearing and dealt with by the court of first instance."41 Yet 
the SCA's strident rejection in Ekurhuleni of the judiciary's capacity to order 
the state to expropriate land in the context of fulfilling its section 26-related 
obligations has evidently not been universally accepted, and has been 
challenged in the current Fischer case. 
3 Fischer 
The Fischer litigation began after the City of Cape Town demolished shacks 
belonging to people who had unlawfully occupied a piece of privately-owned 
land that became known as Marikana, in Philippi, Cape Town, between April 
and August 2013 and in early 2014.42 In February 2014 the Legal Resources 
Centre (LRC) threatened the city with a spoliation application on behalf of 
the occupiers, and in response the property owner (Mrs Fischer) and the 
                                            
37  National Director of Public Prosecutions v Zuma 2009 2 SA 277 (SCA) para 15. 
38  Ekurhuleni para 1. 
39  Ekurhuleni para 10. 
40  Ekurhuleni para 14. 
41  Ekurhuleni paras 14 and 15. 
42  The occupiers had previously been evicted, in waves, from backyard shacks from 
approximately 26 areas of Cape Town.  
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City of Cape Town launched an urgent application in the Western Cape High 
Court to interdict further occupation of the property.43 The LRC then brought 
a counter-application challenging the destruction of the occupiers' homes 
by the City's "anti-land invasion" unit. The application for an interdict was 
settled, with the occupiers agreeing to an interdict that restrained further 
occupation of the Fischer property, but excluded those occupiers who were 
already present on the property.44 
Regarding the spoliation application, on 14 March 2014, the High Court (per 
Gamble J) found the City's approach, which was to argue that it had 
demolished only those structures it found without people or personal effects 
inside them, to be "fundamentally flawed" in that instead of substantively 
questioning whether informal and/or temporary structures were homes, the 
City took a decision based on which structures were occupied at the time of 
the demolition.45 Gamble J consequently rejected the City's argument that 
it was entitled to demolish any such unoccupied structures without a court 
order, and ordered the City to rebuild the shacks.46 The owner and the City 
were granted leave to appeal the decision to the SCA. On 27 May 2014 the 
SCA set aside the High Court order, referring the matter back to the High 
Court for the hearing of oral evidence regarding the City's conduct,47 but the 
spoliation application was later withdrawn following the settlement of the 
interdict application.48 Despite the interdict, the Fischer property and 
surrounding land became known as potentially available for occupation by 
very poor people with nowhere else to go, and substantial numbers of 
people moved onto the properties throughout 2014.49 
By the beginning of 2015, when Mrs Fischer instituted an application for the 
eviction of the occupiers from her land in terms of section 4 of PIE, the 
Marikana settlement had grown to approximately 6,000 households 
comprising at least 20,000 people occupying several privately-owned 
                                            
43  First Respondents' Heads of Argument (17 August 2016) para 11, Fischer v Persons 
Listed on Annexure X to the Notice of Motion and those Persons whose Identity are 
Unknown to the Applicant and who are Unlawfully Occupying or Attempting to 
Occupy Erf 150 (Remaining Extent) Phillipi, Cape Division, Province of the Western 
Cape; Stock v Persons Unlawfully Occupying Erven 145, 152, 156, 418, 3107, 
Phillipi & Portion 0 Farm 597, Cape Rd; Copper Moon Trading 203 (Pty) Ltd v 
Persons whose Identities are to the Applicant Unknown and who are Unlawfully 
Occupying Remainder Erf 149, Phillipi, Cape Town 2018 2 SA 228 (WCC) (Fischer). 
44  First Respondents' Heads of Argument (17 August 2016) para 12, Fischer. 
45  Fischer v Persons Unknown 2014 3 SA 291 (WCC) (hereafter Fischer High Court 
spoliation application). 
46  Fischer High Court spoliation application. 
47  Fischer v Ramahlele 2014 4 SA 614 (SCA). 
48  First Respondents' Heads of Argument (17 August 2016) para 13, Fischer. 
49  First Respondents' Heads of Argument (17 August 2016) para 14, Fischer. 
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properties of which Mrs Fischer's property is one (with a total of at least 
100,000 occupiers across the properties).50 On 25 January 2016 - mindful 
that eviction of such a large group of people was neither humane nor 
practical, and that even "if its occupants could practically be evicted, the 
eviction would simply result in an unlawful land occupation, or several 
unlawful land occupations, elsewhere"51 - Mrs Fischer amended her notice 
of motion seeking, as an alternative to the eviction of the residents, a two-
part remedy comprising a declaration that the City had violated her 
constitutional property rights by failing to provide land for occupation to the 
occupiers and an order compelling the City, and the provincial and national 
housing departments if necessary to purchase her land (valued at market 
value as though not occupied by unlawful occupiers). The Fischer 
application was combined with two other identical applications brought by 
owners of the neighbouring Coppermoon and Stock properties that also 
form part of the Marikana settlement. 
In their notice of counter-application filed on 31 March 2016, the occupiers 
agree that any eviction would be impractical and not just and equitable, and 
set out their sympathy with Mrs Fischer's situation, explaining that the 
occupation occurred out of necessity with the occupiers not knowing the 
property was privately owned (by Mrs Fischer). They further acknowledge 
the infringement to Mrs Fischer's property-related rights alongside the 
violation of their own housing-related rights. They submit, however, that the 
relief sought by Mrs Fischer's amended notice of motion of 25 January 2016 
– namely the prayer for the court to order the state to purchase Mrs Fischer's 
property at market value – "is not competent as a matter of law" because 
the court has "no general power to compel parties before it to contract with 
each other", including to "enter into a sale agreement", and that, therefore, 
"a compulsory purchase order of the nature that Mrs Fischer seeks would 
not be appropriate relief in terms of section 38 of the Constitution."52 
Instead, according to the occupiers' counter-application, if the court is 
convinced that the government has "acted in breach of Mrs Fischer's 
constitutional rights", appropriate relief in terms of section 38 of the 
Constitution would entail directing the municipality or provincial authority to 
exercise their statutory powers in terms of section 9(3) of the Housing Act 
                                            
50  Supplementary answering affidavit, Notice of counter-application (31 March 2016) 
paras 7 to 8.3, Fischer. 
51  Supplementary answering affidavit, Notice of counter-application (31 March 2016) 
para 8.5, Fischer. 
52  Supplementary answering affidavit, Notice of counter-application (31 March 2016) 
paras 12, 15 and 16, Fischer. 
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107 of 1997 (Housing Act)53 to commence proceedings to expropriate the 
property. Alternatively, "[i]n the event that section 9(3) of the Housing Act 
does not apply to this situation", the state's general power to expropriate the 
property in terms of section 2 of the Expropriation Act 63 of 1975 
(Expropriation Act)54 may be engaged and that "on the facts of this case, 
the state may have a duty to expropriate the property as a means of 
protecting both the residents' rights of access to adequate housing and 
protection from arbitrary eviction, and Mrs Fischer's right not to be arbitrarily 
deprived of property".55 Thus the occupiers maintain that appropriate relief 
in terms of section 38 of the Constitution is for the court to direct "the City to 
enter into negotiations with Mrs Fischer56 with a view to either purchasing 
or, if a purchase agreement cannot be reached, expropriating her property 
…".57 
The occupiers furthermore stress that, beyond being appropriate, this relief 
is the only reasonable course of action in the circumstances: 
In this case, there is no serious dispute that the occupiers cannot be practically 
relocated to land elsewhere. They must stay where they are. The only 
reasonable response to the situation is therefore to expropriate the land that 
the occupiers currently live on, in the furtherance of the occupiers' housing 
rights, and to vindicate the property owners' property rights … Simply put, the 
expropriation of the … land in this case is not only necessary, but it is the only 
                                            
53  Section 9(3)(a)(i) of the Housing Act empowers a municipality to expropriate any 
land required by it for the purposes of housing development in terms of any national 
housing programme. There are two national housing programmes that may be 
applicable. First, the Emergency Housing Programme, which requires municipalities 
to investigate and assess the need for emergency housing (including for people who 
will be rendered homeless by an eviction) within their area of jurisdiction and to 
proactively plan for this, applying for additional funds if necessary from provincial 
and/or national government, and if necessary by expropriating land on which people 
under threat of eviction currently reside in order to secure their tenure. Second, the 
Upgrading of Informal Settlements Programme, which prioritises in situ upgrading 
and recognises that many informal settlements are located on privately owned land 
and that any in situ upgrading might require state acquisition of the land. 
54  Section 2 of the Expropriation Act empowers the Minister of Public Works, subject 
to an obligation to pay compensation, to expropriate any property for public 
purposes. 
55  Supplementary answering affidavit, Notice of counter-application (31 March 2016) 
paras 18-19, Fischer. 
56  In their Heads of Argument, the occupiers cite Makate v Vodacom (Pty) Ltd 2016 4 
SA 121 (CC) para 95 (in which the CC directed the parties to negotiate in good faith) 
in support of their argument that an order directing parties to negotiate in good faith 
constitutes appropriate relief (First Respondents' Heads of Argument (17 August 
2016) para 134, Fischer).  
57  Supplementary answering affidavit, Notice of counter-application (31 March 2016) 
para 75.2, Fischer. 
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reasonable course open to a responsible organ of state presented with the 
situation that the parties find themselves in.58 
As underscored in the occupiers' pleadings, the Housing Act and 
Expropriation Act clearly empower the state to expropriate land inter alia to 
fulfil the public purpose of advancing access to adequate housing. 
Therefore, the crisp question raised in Fischer is whether the state is obliged 
to do so? On this question, the occupiers acknowledge that the courts have 
"generally set themselves against directing an organ of state to purchase 
unlawfully occupied property from a private landowner."59 However, they 
point out that the question of whether a court "can order an organ of state 
to expropriate property has been left open", submitting that "in an 
appropriate case" it would constitute "appropriate relief" to "relieve a private 
property owner of the burden of accommodating unlawful occupiers by 
directing the expropriation of property in terms of an organ of state's 
statutory powers to do so."60 
Arguing that in this case the granting of the permissive power to expropriate 
in terms of the Housing Act also "imports an obligation on the authority to 
use the power in certain circumstances",61 the occupiers direct attention to 
authority establishing that "the exercise of a discretionary power may be 
mandatory where the circumstances or statutory context create a duty to 
act."62 Thus, in Levy v Levy63, the SCA held: 
A statutory enactment conferring a power in permissive language may 
nevertheless have to be construed as making it the duty of the person or 
authority in whom the power is reposed to exercise that power when the 
conditions prescribed as justifying its exercise have been satisfied. Whether 
an enactment should be so construed depends on, inter alia, the language in 
which it is couched, the context in which it appears, the general scope and 
object of the legislation, the nature of the thing empowered to be done and the 
person or persons for whose benefit the power is to be exercised.64 
                                            
58  First Respondents' Supplementary Heads of Argument (29 November 2016) paras 
26 and 28, Fischer. 
59  Supplementary answering affidavit, Notice of counter-application (31 March 2016) 
para 72.1, Fischer. 
60  Supplementary answering affidavit, Notice of counter-application (31 March 2016) 
para 72.2, Fischer. 
61  First Respondents' Heads of Argument (17 August 2016) para 122, Fischer. 
62  First Respondents' Heads of Argument (17 August 2016) para 121, Fischer citing 
Levy v Levy 1991 3 SA 614 (AD)  para 32. 
63  1991 3 SA 614 (AD) (hereafter Levy). 
64  Levy para 32. 
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In reaching this conclusion, the SCA in Levy drew on the authority of Noble 
& Barbour v South African Railways and Harbours.65 As was pointed out in 
Noble, this does not mean that every time permissive language is used in 
legislation this should be construed as conferring a mandatory obligation, 
but, as per the concurrent opinion of Lord Blackburn, "the enabling words 
are construed as compulsory whenever the object of the power is to 
effectuate a legal right."66 Similarly, as noted in R v Tithe Commissioners67, 
"it has been so often decided as to have become an axiom that in public 
statutes words only directory, permissory or enabling may have a 
compulsory force where the thing is to be done for the public benefit or in 
advancement of public justice."68 
As argued in the heads of argument for the occupiers, in this case the city 
is under a mandatory obligation to act reasonably. By its own admission, it 
is unlikely ever to be able to accommodate the occupiers on alternative land, 
although some of the occupiers may benefit from emergency housing at 
some unspecified future date. That it may never act in respect of all the 
occupiers is unreasonable.69 That stance leaves the occupiers and the 
owners none the wiser as to when the unlawful occupation of the properties 
will be brought to an end. Although it is true that the owners must exercise 
some patience,70 they are not required to tolerate the situation for an 
indefinite and unascertainable period.71 In these circumstances, according 
to the occupiers' pleadings: 
… the only reasonable course of action available to the City is to acquire the 
properties. Although the court may not order it to do so by reaching a purchase 
agreement with the owners, the court is clearly at large to direct the City to 
exercise its statutory powers, if the exercise of those powers is the only 
reasonable course of action open to it … In the extraordinary circumstances 
of this case, we can think of no other reasonable course than to direct the City 
to exercise its powers under the Housing Act … For that reason, it is also a 
                                            
65  Noble & Barbour v South African Railways and Harbours 1922 AD 527 (hereafter 
Noble) paras 539-40, which cites inter alia South African Railways v New Silverton 
Estate Ltd 1946 AD 830 (hereafter South African Railways) para 842; Commissioner 
for Inland Revenue v A H King 1947 2 SA 196 (A) paras 209-210; and South African 
Railways and Harbours v Transvaal Consolidated Land and Exploration Co Ltd 1961 
2 SA 467 (A) paras 478-80, 502-504. 
66  Noble para 540. 
67  14 CB 474 (hereafter The Commissioners). 
68  As cited in South African Railways para 609. 
69  First Respondents' Heads of Argument (17 August 2016) para 128, Fischer. 
70  Blue Moonlight para 40. 
71  Blue Moonlight para 40. First Respondents' Heads of Argument (17 August 2016) 
para 127, Fischer. 
J DUGARD  PER / PELJ 2018 (21)  15 
course of action the City is legally obliged to adopt, because constitutionally 
informed 'public justice'72 requires it.73 
On 30 August 2017, the High Court delivered its judgment in the Fischer 
matter (per Fortuin, J). It is clear that - having concurred with the occupiers 
regarding the state's failure to fulfil its constitutional obligations vis-à-vis 
both the occupiers and the landowners - Fortuin, J grappled with the 
separation of powers concerns that dominated Hurt AJA's Ekurhuleni 
judgment, and which the state respondents relied on in Fischer to argue that 
the occupiers' prayers were not appropriate.74 Seized by the City's 
acknowledgment of not being able to provide alternative emergency shelter 
to the occupiers, Fortuin, J, described her dilemma as follows: 
The City has admitted that they may never be able to accommodate the 
occupiers elsewhere. This leaves the applicants and the occupiers alike in an 
untenable position. The only reasonable course of action is for the occupiers 
to stay where they are, thereby enforcing their rights in terms of s26. The 
question is how to do this without encroaching on the s25 rights of the 
applicants. Moreover, the question is how to achieve this goal without, by 
ordering the parties to perform in a specific way, overstepping the boundaries 
of the doctrine of separation of powers, i.e. how to avoid the mistake made by 
the High Court in the Ekurhuleni Municipality matter. This is the balancing act 
this court will have to perform.75 
To add to the balancing act, on the subject of relief - relying inter alia on 
Fose v Minister of Safety and Security 76- Fortuin, J underscored that 
appropriate relief is such relief necessary to protect and enforce the 
Constitution77 and that the court "is obliged to forge new and creative 
remedies in order to ensure effective relief where a constitutional right has 
been infringed".78 
Attempting to navigate a principled approach between the separation of 
powers concerns on the one hand and the need to secure an effective 
remedy on the other hand, Fortuin, J highlighted three critical distinctions 
between the Fischer case and Ekurhuleni. First, Ekurhuleni involved "a very 
small number of people", making the possibility of evicting and relocating 
the occupiers "very real",79 whereas in Fischer there are approximately 
100,000 occupiers. Second, in Ekurhuleni it was not concluded that the 
                                            
72  R v Tithe Commissioners 14 CB 474, cited in South African Railways para 609. 
73  First Respondents' Heads of Argument (17 August 2016) paras 128-131, Fischer. 
74  Fischer para 153.1. 
75  Fischer para 167. 
76  1997 3 SA 786 (CC) (hereafter Fose). 
77  Fischer para 22 citing Fose para 19. 
78  Fischer para 160. 
79  Fischer para 164. 
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state could not provide alternative emergency shelter, whereas in Fischer 
"it is undisputed that the City cannot provide alternative accommodation for 
the occupiers."80 Third, whereas in Ekurhuleni the occupiers had not raised 
the matter of expropriation, in Fischer the occupiers had explicitly raised this 
as part of their prayers.81 On this basis, Fortuin, J concluded in line with the 
occupiers' pleadings, that the only reasonable remedy was to order the City 
to "enter into good faith negotiations with Mrs Fischer [and the other 
landowners] in order to purchase her property …"; to order the National 
Minister of Housing and/or the Provincial Minister of Housing: Western Cape 
Government to provide the City "with the necessary funds to purchase Mrs 
Fischer's property, should such funds fall beyond the City's budget"; and, in 
the event of any failure to agree on the value of the property within one 
month of the order, to report back to the court on the progress of the 
negotiations.82 
4 Conclusion 
Seeking to ensure sound legal reasoning and a coherent approach to 
expropriation, property law luminary Andre van der Walt has proposed a 
narrow approach regarding the sources of expropriation, with the focus very 
much on administrative expropriation.83 In this regard Van der Walt has 
argued against recognising statutory and constructive expropriation in 
South Africa.84 Regarding judicial expropriation, Van der Walt was clearly 
cautious, noting that "uncommonly", "legislation can authorise a court to 
bring about judicial expropriation by making an appropriate order in terms 
of the statute."85 
It is clear that, while the Housing Act and Expropriation Act enable the state 
to expropriate property for the purposes, as in the Fischer case, of 
advancing access to adequate housing, neither piece of legislation explicitly 
authorises a court to "bring about judicial expropriation". However, is it 
possible that, where legislation empowers the state to expropriate in the 
public interest, courts can oblige the state to consider this option? According 
                                            
80  Fischer para 165. 
81  Fischer para 165. 
82  Fischer paras 197-199. The court's orders were the same in respect of the Stock 
and Coppermoon properties save that the court allowed two months for the 
negotiations to occur, since in these cases the properties had been acquired for 
commercial purposes, whereas Mrs Fischer had inherited her property and it was 
her only residential property, heightening the need for urgent resolution.  
83  Van der Walt Constitutional Property Law 433. 
84  Van der Walt Constitutional Property Law 433. 
85  Van der Walt Constitutional Property Law 433. 
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to Van der Walt, the "power of expropriation is based on statute and granted 
to specific administrators, who must exercise their statutory discretion when 
taking the administrative decision whether or not to expropriate", and that 
the "courts cannot usurp this discretion or direct the expropriator in its 
exercise of the discretion."86 In some instances, it might be possible to 
"attack the administrative failure to take a decision, but that will only be the 
case when there was a clear duty on the administrator to make the decision 
at the particular point in time."87 
Although not (yet) constituting outright judicial expropriation, the Fischer 
case constitutes a new, grey area between administrative and judicial 
expropriation. For the first time in South Africa, a court has ordered the state 
to negotiate with private landowners with a view to purchasing their 
properties or, if a purchase price cannot be agreed, to report back to the 
court on the progress of the negotiations. While this might seem like a 
radical move by the court that certainly goes beyond Van der Walt's caution 
(above), it is arguably a necessary approach in the light of the systemic 
failure of the state (whether national, provincial or local, and across the 
country) to fulfil its section 26 housing rights-related obligations. In this 
context - and specifically in cases in which there are large numbers of 
occupiers on private land - the courts might have to gingerly step some way 
across the traditional separation of powers line towards the realm of judicial 
expropriation in order to uphold constitutional rights, including the section 
28 right to an effective remedy. 
After all, the central consideration for courts in crafting remedies for 
violations of constitutional rights "is to ensure the effective vindication and 
protection of the right violated."88 Sandra Liebenberg explains that this is 
important not only to the immediate victims of the relevant rights violations, 
but also to the broader public, in order to ensure the "effective protection of 
constitutional rights", which "are fundamental to the fabric of our post-1994 
constitutional democracy."89 To this end, as emphasised by the 
Constitutional Court in Fose, the Constitution provides a permissive 
framework for the crafting of creative and effective remedies.90 
Just as Modderklip provided the novel remedy of constitutional damages, 
Fischer has developed the novel remedy of ordering the state to negotiate 
                                            
86  Van der Walt Constitutional Property Law 386. 
87  Van der Walt Constitutional Property Law 386-387. 
88  Liebenberg 2016 PELJ 4. 
89  Liebenberg 2016 PELJ 4. 
90  For more on remedies see for example Bishop "Remedies". 
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with landowners regarding taking over their properties to fulfil its section 26 
housing obligations. In doing so, Fischer has gone some way towards 
answering the question left hanging by both the SCA and CC in the 
Modderklip case, regarding whether a court may order an organ of state to 
expropriate property in instances of unfeasible eviction, providing a 
compellingly transformative interpretation of the law in relation to housing 
rights.91 
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